

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 02619 01 OF 03 172115Z POSS DUPE
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 ARA-10 EA-10 NEA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 DHA-02 ACDA-07
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 /116 W
-----072204 172157Z /73

O R 171858Z AUG 77
FM US ISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4904
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USUN 2619

STOCKHOLM FOR AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, UN, SF, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING OF SOUTH AFRICA, ETC.

1. THE FOLLOWING, AD REFERENDUM TO CAPITALS, IS THE NEW YORK
CONTACT GROUP'S AGREED TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR USE IN
BRIEFING SOUTH AFRICA, THE FRONTLINE STATES, NIGERIA AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 02619 01 OF 03 172115Z POSS DUPE

UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALHDEIM ON THE RESULTS OF THE
WESTERN FIVE TALKS WITH SWAPO.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT DEPUTY UK PERM REP JAMES MURRAY WILL
BRIEF WALDHEIM ON BEHALF OF THE FIVE IN VIENNA
AUGUST 18. THE FIVE AMBASSADORS/CHARGES IN THE FRONT-
LINE STATES AND NIGERIA PRESUMABLY WILL BRIEF HOST

GOVERNMENTS AND WILL, THEREFORE, HAVE TO CONSULT ON THE TIMING. ASSUMING NO MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE AGREED TEXT, BRIEFINGS BEFORE THE START OF THE LAGOS ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCE (AUGUST 22) WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

QUOTE

THE FIVE'S BRIEFING OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE FRONTLINE STATES, AND NIBERIA AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD IN ALL CASES BEGIN WITH AN ORAL PRESENTATION OF THE NON-PAPER AGREED BETWEEN THE FIVE AND SWAPO ON 11 AUGUST. THESE BRIEFINGS WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY REMARKS TAILORED TO FIT THE MAIN PREOCCUPATIONS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED, AND WOULD STRESS BOTH THE POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TALKS WITH SWAPO AND THE FURTHER ACTION WHICH THE FIVE NOW HOPED EACH PARTY WOULD TAKE, OR BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND.

FOR SOUTH AFRICA

(A) THE CONTACT GROUP'S TALKS WITH SWAPO WERE BUSINESSLIKE, AND SWAPO WERE LED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY POSSIBLE PRACITIAL SOLUTIONS.

(B) SWAPO'S INITIAL PRESENTATION LISTED THOSE MAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH IN THEIR VIEW HAD TO BE MET IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. THOSE WHICH SHOULD NOT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES WERE FREE ELECTIONS, UNIMPEDED PROGRESS TO GENUINE INDEPENDENCE, RESPECT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 02619 01 OF 03 172115Z POSS DUPE

AND PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY, RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA, AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NAMIBIA - THOUGH IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IN CONNECTION WITH THE LAST, THAT THE QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY'S FUTURE WAS NOT RAISED BY EITHER SIDE.

(C) IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MAIN OBSTACLES RELATED TO TH NATURE OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND , MORE IMPORTANT, TO SWAPO'S DEMAND THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES SHOULD BE COMPLETELY WITH-

DRAWN BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. THE TAKS THEREFORE CONCENTRATED ON THESE TWO ISSUES, AND SECONDLY ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS.

(D) ON WITHDRAWAL, AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF MILITARY DISPOSITIONS DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, THE MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS WERE SWAPO'S ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE TO A CEASEFIRE AND THE CONFINEMENT TO BASE OF THEIR FORCES. WE DID NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILED CONDITIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH IT WAS AGREED SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED BEFORE THE PASSAGE OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND TAKE EFFECT UPON THE ARRIVL OF THE U.N. ELEMENT. NOR DID WE DISCUSS AT THIS STAGE WHERE SWAPO'S TROOPS WOULD BE CNFINED ON AND AFTER THE DATE OF THE CEASEFIRE. SWAPO HAVE, HOWEVER, ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT SUCH CONFINEMENT SHOULD BE SUPERVISED BY UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS.

(E) SWAPO INSISTED UPON A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY FIXED IDEAS ABOUT THE SIZE OF SUCH A FORCE BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE OF A SIZE SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS. WE SUGGESTED THAT THE UN'S CHIEF RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS FIELD WAS TO SUPERVISE A CEASEFIRE, AND THAT THIS COULD EQUALLY AS WELL BE EFFECTED BY CIVILIAN OR MILITARY OBSERVERS UNDER THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S DIRECTION AS BY A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. A POSSIBLE WAY OF DEALING WITH THIS MIGHT BE THE ORGANIZATION OF AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF MILITARY OBSERVERS AS A GROUP ATTACHED TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

(F) ON THE QUESTION OF THE RATE OF WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES, SWAPO REMAINED ADAMANT DURING THIS ROUND OF TALKS THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. WE CONTINUED TO STATE OUR VIEW THAT A NEGOTIATED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 USUN N 02619 01 OF 03 172115Z POSS DUPE

SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE A PLAN OF PHASED SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL OVER

THE WHOLE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SWAPO'S POSITION IS FAR REMOVED FROM YOUR OWN BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT IT MAY BE SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE THAN THEY WOULD ADMIT INITIALLY. TO BUILD CONFIDENCE AND ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY WE NOW URGENTLY NEED FROM YOU AN ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN OF PHASED AND SUBSTANTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES. IN OUR VIEW THIS IS AN AREA IN WHICH SUBSTANTIAL COMPROMISE WILL HAVE TO BE MADE IF AGREEMENT IS TO BE REACHED. A PROPERLY SUPERVISED CEASEFIRE SHOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE NEED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LARGE FORCES IN NAMIBIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 02619 02 OF 03 172140Z
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 ARA-10 EA-10 NEA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 DHA-02 ACDA-07
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 /116 W
-----072375 172158Z /73

O R 171858Z AUG 77

FM US MISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4905

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USUN 2619

STOCKHOLM FOR AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY

(G) AS WE HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED, SWAPO RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE
ROLE OF THE POLICE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. WE HAVE NOT
DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION IN ANY DETAIL WITH YOU SO FAR, BUT WOULD
LIKE TO DO SO WHEN WE NEXT MEET.

(H) AS REGARDS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, SWAPO INITIALLY TOOK THE POSITION THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 02619 02 OF 03 172140Z

WHILE THEY DID NOT OBJECT TO THE PRESENCE OF SOME SOUTH AFRICAN
PERSONNEL IN THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF AMIBIA, THE UN HAD
TO BE IN A DOMINANT POSITION. WE REPLIED THAT SWAPO'S POSITION
MERELY REAFFIRMED THE STANDARD UN JURIDICAL VIEW OF THE
PROBLEM, AND WE TOLD SWAPO THAT THE EXPRESSION "THE ADMINISTRATOR-
GENERAL WOULD HAVE TO SATISFY THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AT ALL
STAGES" SHOULD FULLY MEET SWAPO'S PREOCCUPATIONS. SWAPO EVENTUALLY
AGREED THAT WHATEVER THE TERMINOLOGY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD HAVE TO HAVE THE POWER TO APPROVE THE
ACTIONS OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, IN SO FAR AS THE
TRANSITIONAL PROCESS WAS CONCERNED, ON THIS BASIS, SWAPO WOULD NOT
OPPOSE THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL BY SOUTH
AFRICA. WE BELIEVE THAT, THOUGH BOTH SIDES WILL NO DOUBT
PRESENT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THEIR OWN WORDS, THERE DOES NOW APPEAR TO
BY UNDERLYING AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER. IN PARTICULAR,

SWAPO UNDERSTOOD THAT WHILE "APPROVAL" WOULD BE THEIR EXPRESSION,
THE FIVE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE "TO BE SATISFIED WITH".

(I) SWAPO DID ACQUIESCE IN ADVANCE CONTINGENCY PLANNING BY THE UN

SECRETARIAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 385, BEARING IN MIND OF COURSE THAT NO FORMAL ACTION COULD BE TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL. WE ARE SPEAKING TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND URGING HIM TO INSTRUCT HIS STAFF TO BEGIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING, IN CONSULTATION WITH US.

(J) SWAPO REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT WHAT THEY REGARDED AS THE OPEN SUPPORT WHICH SOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN GIVING IN RECENT WEEKS TO THE TURNHALLE REPRESENTATIVES. WE POINTED OUT TO SWAPO, THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR EARLY MOVEMENT TOWARDS AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT AND THE INSTALLATION OF A UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN NAMIBIA. AS YOU KNOW, WE STRONGLY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 02619 02 OF 03 172140Z

BELIEVE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE IMPARTIAL, AND BE SEEN TO BE IMPARTIAL PRIOR TO AND DURING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS.

(K) AS YOU WILL HAVE GATHERED FROM OUR EARLIER PRESENTATION, THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE PROPOSED PANAL OF JURISTS. WE BELIEVEE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS SHOULD BE A MANAGEABLE PROBLEM, A SOLUTION TO WHICH SHOULD FALL INTO PLACE ONCE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE MAJOR ISSUES.

(L) AS REGARDS DETAINEES AND POLITICAL PRISONERS, SWAPO EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO SEE ALL SUCH NAMIBIANS HELD BY SOUTH AFRICA RELEASED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. WE REITERATED OUR VIEW THAT THE SAME PRINCIPLE APPLIED TO ALL NAMIBIANS WHEREVER HELD, BUT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER.

(M) THE CONTACT GROUP LOOK FORWARD TO A FURTHER ROUND OF TALKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM AS TO THE LOCATION AND TIMING.

FOR NIGERIA AND FRONT-LINE STATES

NIGERIAN AND THE FRONT-LINE STATES SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, ALTHOUGH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES REMAIN, WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY OUR TALKS WITH SWAPO WHICH WE FOUND VALUAGLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. THEIR OUTCOME SUGGESTS THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM PROVIDED THAT FURTHER FLEXIBILITY ON ALL SIDES CAN BE OBTAINED. WE OURSELVES ARE APPROACHING SOUTH AFRICA ONCE MORE. WE WOULD BE GREATFUL IF THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS MIGHT USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE SWAPO TO BE READY TO CONSIDER APPROACHES WHICH WOULD PERMIT FURHER PROGRESS. IN ADDITION, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SWAPO ACQUIESCED IN THE NEED FOR THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH ADVANCE PLANNING BY THE SECRETARIAT, BEARING IN MIND OF COURSE THAT NO FORMAL ACTION COULD BE TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 02619 03 OF 03 172135Z
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 ARA-10 EA-10 NEA-10
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 DHA-02 ACDA-07
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 /116 W
-----072356 172159Z /73

O R 171858Z AUG 77
FM US MISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4906
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY GABORONE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USUN 2619

STOCKHOLM FOR AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY

FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE TIME TO GIVE WALDHEIM A
DETAILED BRIEFING ON ALL ASPECTS OF OUR TALKS WITH SWAPO BEFORE HE
LEAVES FOR LAGOS. IT IS SUGGESTED THEREFORE THAT AT THIS STAGE
WALDHEIM SHOULD SIMPLY BE GIVEN AN ORAL PRESENTATION OF THE AGREED
NON-PAPER, FOLLOWED BY THE PARTICULAR POINTS ON CONTINGENCY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N 02619 03 OF 03 172135Z

PLANNING SET OUT BELOW; AND THAT HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THE

FIVE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE A FULLER DISCUSSION WITH HIM AT A CONVENIENT MOMENT.

(A) PRESENTATION OF AGREED NON-PAPER.

(B) AS YOU WILL SEE, WE EXPLAINED TO SWAPO THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MOVE AHEAD, PARTICULARLY IN FORMULATING A MANDATE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, UNLESS THE UN SECRETARIAT WERE PREPARED TO MAKE SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING OF THEIR OWN, AND NOT SIMPLY TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION BY THE FIVE. SWAPO INDICATED TO US THAT THEY HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE SECRETARIAT COMMENCING SUCH PLANNING IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 385, BEARING IN MIND, OF COURSE, THAT NO FORMAL ACTION COULD BE TAKEN IN ADVANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL.

(C) WE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH SWAPO THAT FORMAL ACTION WOULD REQUIRE SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESSED TO US AT OUR LAST MEETING ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF PROCEEDING WITH CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITHIN THE SECRETARIAT IN THE ABSENCE OF PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE BASIC ISSUES SHOULD NOW HAVE BEEN DISPELLED BY SWAPO'S WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO SUCH PLANNING. WE, THEREFORE, CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT WHEN YOU RETURN TO NEW YORK, AND AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION IF NECESSARY WITH US, YOU WILL AGREE THAT SUCH PLANNING SHOULD NOW BE UNDERTAKEN. WE DO NOT WISH TO SEE A SITUATION IN WHICH A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES CANNOT BE CARRIED FORWARD BECAUSE THE U.N. HAS NOT UNDERTAKEN CONTINGENCY PLANNING. THIS WOULD INCLUDE GIVING THOUGHT TO THE LEVEL OF STAFFING REQUIRED, AND TO WHICH COUNTRIES MIGHT BE APPROACHED AT A LATER STAGE TO PROVIDE INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S STAFF. OTHERWISE THERE IS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 USUN N 02619 03 OF 03 172135Z

A REAL RISK OF A LENGTHY INTERVAL BETWEEN THE PASSAGE OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND UNITED NATIONS ABILITY TO MUSTER THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF STAFF TO ACCOMPANY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND SO TO INAUGURATE UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.

YOUNG

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, BRIEFING MATERIALS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 17-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977USUNN02619
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770297-0570
Format: TEL
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770851/aaaabqzx.tel
Line Count: 378
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: beb21759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1571736
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NAMIBIA: TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING OF SOUTH AFRICA, ETC.
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA, UN
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbsc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/beb21759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009